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1 Introduction
This paper examines the allocation of business research and development (R&D)
subsidies by analyzing the determinants of acceptance into an R&D subsidy
program. More speciﬁcally the question addressed is whether there are diﬀer-
ences in how subsidies are allocated to small and medium size ﬁrms (SMEs)
and large ﬁrms. The standard rationales for R&D subsidies, namely spillovers
and ﬁnancial constraints, do not apply equally to SMEs and large ﬁrms. The
existing literature provides several reasons why information asymmetries un-
derlying ﬁnancial constraints are more sever in SMEs than in large ﬁrms. In
addition, appropriability problems linked to spillovers are likely to hamper more
the innovative acitivies of SMEs compared to large ﬁrms. These diﬀerences are
increasingly taken into account in the design of R&D subsidy policies.1 Yet,
it is unclear how these principles are reﬂected in actual decision making. The
program under scrutiny is that of the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology
and Innovation (Tekes) for which I have unique data on everyone who applied
over a two and a half year period including data on internal project evaluations
of Tekes.
Finland provides an interesting case to analyze how a key innovation policy
instrument, direct R&D subsidies, is designed and implemented. First, Finland
has experienced a particularly rapid and successful transformation to a tech-
nology intensive economy [25, 34]. Although Finland industrialized relatively
late it has gained a leading positions in several recent international comparisons
of technological advancement and economic competitiveness. Innovation policy
has played a central role in government policy during the transformation and is
often praised for contributing to the success of the Finnish economy [13, 27].
Second, direct R&D subsidies constitute a key ingredient of the Finnish
innovation policy [10]. Instead of being a marginal and fragmented activity,
R&D subsidies are at the core of the Finnish innovation policy. The program
has been consistently operated and developed over the past twenty years.
Third, unlike many other countries, the majority of R&D subsidies are ad-
ministered by a single public agency, Tekes. Instead of several small, relatively
focused programs administered by diﬀerent institutions and adhering to diﬀer-
ent criteria, Finland has a relatively uniﬁed R&D subsidy program open to all
innovative ﬁrms operating in Finland.
1EU regulations allow for diﬀerent treatment of SMEs and large ﬁrms and increasingly
programs have diﬀerent criteria for SMEs and large ﬁrms.
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Fourth, while Tekes funding is available to all innovative ﬁrms operating in
Finland, one clear trend in the business funding of Tekes since the beginning of
the 90's has been an increasing emphasis on SMEs. The share of applications
by ﬁrms with less than 100 employees increased from 36 % in 1990 to 69 % in
2000 and the share of business funding allocated to SMEs rose from 22 % in
1990 to 53 % in 2000.2
The main contribution of the paper is to increase our understanding of the
functioning of R&D subsidy programs. The unique data at hand allows to ana-
lyze in detail the bureaucratic decision-making underlying the allocation of R&D
subsidies in Finland. The empirical literature analyzing R&D subsidies has fo-
cused on establishing the link between subsidies and ﬁrm's R&D investments
or performance. However, an understanding of the details of how R&D subsidy
programs actually function is lacking. In order to assess the functioning and
eﬃciency of R&D subsidy programs in practice, it is crucial to understand the
overall allocation of subsidies - who is it that ﬁnally participates in the program
and why. Given that R&D subsidies constitute a selective innovation policy
tool, a central issue in the overall allocation is how government bureaucrats
allocate subsidies to applicants. By analyzing the rationals, design and func-
tioning of an R&D subsidy program this paper provides a descriptive account of
an R&D subsidy program, but also hopes to provide a more general discussion
that is helpful in understanding the operations of R&D subsidy programs and
in identifying issues that should be carefully scrutinized.
The framework of the analysis in this study has relevance also in terms
of quantitative program evaluation. In order to properly analyze the eﬀects
of public R&D subsidies on private R&D activities, the participation process
creating the selection has to be well understood (see [16]). The allocation rule
of government bureaucrats constitutes a central element of the participation
process. Although the allocation rule is diﬀerent for diﬀerent R&D subsidy
programs and the empirical results in this study are speciﬁc to the R&D subsidy
program in question, this paper helps to structure our understanding of how the
selection is actually created.
So far, relatively little systematic attention has been paid to the allocation
rule that government bureaucrats use to allocate R&D subsidies. One reason has
certainly been the lack of data. Government agencies allocating R&D subsidies
2An enterprise is considered a SME if 1) it has less than 250 employees, 2) large ﬁrms
ownership is under 25% and 3) its yearly turnover is less than 40 million euros or its balance
sheet total is not over 27 million euros.
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are not eager to give access to their databases - if they keep one. However, it
also seems that the widespread political urge to get plausible evidence about the
eﬀectiveness of R&D policies in terms of additionality, productivity and growth
has diverted attention from the issue of allocation. Yet, reliable impact estimates
are diﬃcult to get without a thorough understanding of the participation process
that determines the allocation of R&D subsidies. In addition it is diﬃcult to
interpret the impact estimates and draw policy conclusions if the functioning of
the policy instrument is not fully understood.
There are a few papers that touch upon the issue of government allocation
of R&D subsidies. The two closest to this paper are Feldman and Kelley [8]
and Blanes and Busom [5]. Feldman and Kelley study whether the Advanced
Technology Program in U.S. has been successful in identifying and awarding
funding to ﬁrms that are more likely to generate knowledge spillovers. They
ﬁnd that this has indeed been the case. Blanes and Busom in turn analyze how
ﬁrm characteristics are related to the participation of ﬁrms in R&D subsidy
programs. Their data does not allow distinguishing between the application
and approval phases, nor do they have project-level information.
Of other related papers Aschhoﬀ [4] focuses on analyzing the structure of
the subsidy recipients in Germany over time. She ﬁnds that participation in the
funding scheme is quite stable. However, her data does not allow to distinguish
the rejected applicants from the non-applicants. Lichtenberg [19] and Desmet
el al. [6] focus on analyzing programs targeted to one speciﬁc ﬁeld. Lichtenberg
[19] analyzes the determinants of allocation of public biomedical research ex-
penditure. More speciﬁcally, he analyzes how diﬀerent characteristics of disease
burden aﬀect the amount of public research expenditure allocated on a disease.
Desmet et al. [6] in turn focus on participants of Spain's National Pharmaceuti-
cal Research Program. They analyze how ex-ante announced criteria are related
to the ex-post ranking of participants. They ﬁnd a discrepancy between ex-ante
announced and ex-post applied criteria, but argue that the plan's implementa-
tion has broadly been in line with its objectives. In addition, this paper has
links also to the literature of bureaucratic decision-making that analyzes the
preferences of government bureaucrats in various settings [20, 21, 33, 15, 14].
Compared to earlier work this study uses unusually rich project-level data
consisting of detailed information on the internal project evaluations of Tekes for
both applicants and non-applicants. To my knowledge, diﬀerences in allocation
of subsidies to SMEs and large ﬁrms has not been looked at before. In addition,
the data contains information on the granted subsidy-rate (share of costs covered
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by the subsidy) allowing an analysis of both the acceptance decision and the
subsidy-rate decision.
The results indicate that the technological content of a project proposal is an
important determinant of the subsidy decisions both for SMEs and large ﬁrms.
This result may ﬁnd some basis in economic rationales justifying R&D subsidies.
Unlike what the rationales might predict Tekes has diﬃculties in tolerating
commercial risks especially in the case of SMEs. In addition, the results show
that collaboration within a project matters more for projects initiated by SMEs.
This may suggest that Tekes puts more emphasis on encouraging incoming than
outgoing spillovers.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 discusses the theoret-
ical issues related to R&D subsidies namely, the rationales for R&D subsidies
and problems related to the design and implementation of R&D subsidy poli-
cies. Section 3 describes the design and implementation of the Tekes R&D
subsidy program. Section 5 moves toward the empirical analysis by presenting
the data. Section 4 goes through the econometric setup and section 6 presents
the estimation results. Finally, section 7 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical premises of R&D subsidies policies
The economic justiﬁcations for government intervention in the form of R&D
subsidies to the private sector relies on the widely accepted argument that a
market economy may fail to provide adequate incentives for ﬁrms to invest in
innovation [23, 2]. This is due to two familiar market failures that have to
do with a) higher social than private beneﬁts of R&D and b) the availability of
market ﬁnance in the presence of information asymmetries. An identiﬁed market
failure raises the question of whether government intervention could improve the
situation. The eﬃciency of government intervention depends primarily on two
issues:
1. Whether an appropriate policy instrument can be designed.
2. Whether this instrument is eﬃciently implemented.
Several policy instruments are designed to address one or both of the above
market failures. Intellectual property rights are designed to improve the appro-
priability of knowledge and that way increase the incentives for R&D (see e.g.
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[28] for a survey). Tax reliefs in turn aim for the same by reducing the cost
of R&D (see [12]). There are also public eﬀorts to increase the functioning of
ﬁnancial markets (e.g. support to venture capital markets) in order to reduce
possible ﬁnancial constraints. A thorough overview and comparison of several
technology and innovation policy instruments is, however, beyond the scope of
this paper. In this paper the focus is purely on direct R&D subsidies. This
section discusses the theoretical premises of the design and implementation of
R&D subsidies.
2.1 Rationales for R&D subsidies
Due to the non-rival and non-exclusive properties of knowledge innovation activ-
ities of ﬁrms are associated with positive externalities. Once new knowledge is
created it is diﬃcult to preclude others from using it. Knowledge spills over for
the beneﬁt of others without the creator being able to appropriate the full bene-
ﬁt of it. Some of the beneﬁt accrues also to purchasers in the form lower prices or
new and improved products. Given these positive externalities or spillovers so-
cial beneﬁts from innovative activities may be considerably higher than private
ones and a market economy may fail to generate the socially optimal investment
in innovation.
In addition to positive externalities, innovation is an inherently uncertain en-
deavor. Uncertainty gives rise to information asymmetries like agency conﬂicts
[17] and the 'lemons' problem [18, 22] that may generate ﬁnancing constraints.
An innovator has private information about her innovation activities that is dif-
ﬁcult to assess by third parties like ﬁnanciers. These information asymmetries
can make external capital more expensive than internal capital. In the absence
of internal funds, this may prevent ﬁrms from undertaking economically viable
projects creating ﬁnancing constraints.
The above basic rationales underlying business R&D subsidies do not dif-
ferentiate between large and small ﬁrms. However, there are several arguments
why especially SMEs may suﬀer more from the identiﬁed market failures. To
begin with, the ﬁnancial constraints argument is more probable for SMEs. Al-
though the development of ﬁnancial markets has somewhat reduced the appeal
of the ﬁnancial constraints argument, there is evidence that innovation projects
of young and small innovative ﬁrms may still face ﬁnancing constraints (see e.g.
[30, 11]).
In addition, the literature suggests that from an economy-wide perspective
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the market may generate too little risk-taking especially in the innovative ac-
tivities of SMEs [3, 34].3 The same project conducted in a small ﬁrm can be
riskier compared to what it would be if conducted in a large ﬁrm. SMEs are
often focusing on one or a few projects compared to large ﬁrms with project
portfolios containing a whole range of projects. They are also unlikely to have
competencies and experience that are complementary to R&D to the extent that
large ﬁrms have. Moreover, due to information asymmetries the risk premium
imposed on SMEs by external ﬁnanciers is likely to be larger compared to large
ﬁrms.
Based on the above it can be concluded that for the allocation of subsidies
to be consistent with economic rationales the diﬀerences in the allocation of
subsidies to SMEs and large ﬁrms should reﬂect the following arguments.
• SMEs are likelier to suﬀer from ﬁnancing constraints.
• Subsidizing risk-taking is more justiﬁable in the case of SMEs.
• Subsidizing large ﬁrms relies to a large extent on the spillover justiﬁcation.
In relation to the last argument, literature suggests that compared to SMEs
large ﬁrms can better internalize the spillovers [34, 9]. This means that the
inappropriability problem may dilute less the innovative activities of large ﬁrms.
In this sense even the spillover argument may be more pronounced for SMEs.
However, the R&D activities of large ﬁrms often cover also more basic research
oriented R&D. From policy point of view large ﬁrms can be considered as an
important source of spillovers. As a result public R&D policies towards large
ﬁrms often emphasize subsidizing outgoing spillovers through collaboration.
2.2 Government failure and bureaucratic decision-making
Government intervention always raises the question of whether an identiﬁed
market failure is only replaced by government failure. Even if there seems to
be scope for government intervention from a theoretical point of view, it is
not clear whether the government can improve the situation in practice. Is the
government capable of making eﬃcient allocation decisions to correct the market
failure? In the case of R&D subsidies, it is unlikely that government intervention
could lead to the optimal outcome. The diﬃcult task is to determine whether
3In general, corporate ﬁnance literature suggests that limited liability encourages corporate
risk-taking, and such limited liability considerations should be more relevant for smaller ﬁrms,
which have stronger incentive to "bet for resurrection".
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a certain government intervention is justiﬁed when the distortions it brings
are taken into account [1]. Stiglitz [29] argues that government intervention is
warranted when it is possible to achieve a near-Pareto improvement, i.e. an
improvement of which almost everyone beneﬁts. The problem is that in general
the outputs generated by government intervention are such that an objective
measure of proﬁtability and eﬃciency is extremely hard to obtain [7, 20].
There are three main issues underlying the possible government failure re-
lated to R&D subsidy policies.4 The ﬁrst issue concerns the target group for
the policy. Even if there is assumed to be room for government intervention in
the form of R&D subsidies, it is an open question what kind of activities should
be subsidized and how to identify those projects. From a theoretical point of
view projects with higher social beneﬁts than private ones should be subsidized.
Which are these projects in practice and how to identify them? It is clear that
bureaucrats face informational problems in making the allocation decisions, but
an open question is whether these informational problems are so severe that a
speciﬁed market failure cannot be adequately addressed in practice.
The second issue has to do with the incentives that govern bureaucratic
decision making. What is it that the bureaucrats are maximizing? Are the
bureaucrats motivated merely by goals that beneﬁt only themselves or are they
indeed interested in maximizing social welfare as a benevolent social planner
should be? Corruption is one obvious force that can distort bureaucratic be-
havior. In addition, there are other, not so obvious, distorting forces at stake.
Heckman and others [14] highlight that performance standards may provide in-
centives that lead possibly self-interested bureaucrats to e.g. cream-skimming.
Niskanen [24] in turn suggests that bureaucrats are more interested in maximiz-
ing the overall budget of their bureau than social welfare. In addition, lobbying
by diﬀerent interest groups could divert the decision-making of government bu-
reaucrats.
The third issue is related to the general equilibrium eﬀects of an R&D policy.
Namely, are there associated negative externalities that undermine the positive
eﬀects of spillovers?5 In other words, to what extent subsidizing some projects
4This paper focuses on bureaucratic decision-making and problems related to political
decision-making are not discussed. McFadden [20] points out that often the general goal set
by politicians consists of vague statements and bureaucrats are left with considerable freedom
in translating this goal into concrete decision rules. This applies also to innovation policy in
Finland.
5An obvious addition to the list would be: Do the costs of putting up and administering
an R&D subsidy program outweigh the beneﬁts. Although relevant, this question is omitted
here.
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generate distortions that harm the non-subsidized? This is related to the near-
Pareto improvement - are almost everybody beneﬁting from the subsidy policy
or in other words, do the gains from the policy outweigh the losses? It may be for
example that subsidies create unwarranted competitive advantage to some ﬁrms.
Or at the technological level, is it possible that a more promising technology
is left unexplored, because subsidies made the exploration of another related
technology more attractive?
Given the above problems related to government intervention and the diﬃ-
culty of assessing the presence and magnitude of these problems, it is not clear
whether government intervention is warranted. As Acemoglu and Verdier [1]
point out, some would prefer to live with the market failures, while others are
willing to accept that there is a trade oﬀ between government failure and market
failure. From a welfare point of view government intervention may be in some
cases optimal even though it is associated with government failure. In relation
to corruption, Acemoglu and Verdier show that government intervention with
partial corruption is optimal, if corruption is relatively rare and the market
failure in question is relatively important.
3 R&D subsidies in practice - the Finnish exam-
ple
3.1 Introduction of Tekes
Tekes is the principal public promoter of private R&D in Finland and also
the most important public ﬁnancier of business R&D (for an overview of the
Finnish innovation support institutions see e.g. [10]). Tekes provides funding
and expert services to both business and public R&D. Public R&D consists of
research conducted in universities, academic institutions and research institutes.
According to the Tekes annual report 2002, Tekes funding decisions amounted
to 381 million euros in 2002, of which 237 million euros was allocated to the
business sector.6 In terms of projects this translates into 2017 projects of which
1219 were business R&D projects.
The basic ﬁrm-level eligibility criteria for the business R&D funding of Tekes
6Given that the sample period used in this study is from January 2000 to June 2002 the
ﬁgures and funding principles used in the description are also from that period. Despite the
somewhat outdated sample period, there are little changes to the main funding practices of
Tekes and to large extent the same funding principles still apply.
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is that the ﬁrm is operating in Finland. Funding is project-based and depends
on the initiative of industry to deﬁne research projects. Firms submit applica-
tions and Tekes' business and technology experts evaluate every proposal. Key
funding instruments of Tekes are grants and low-interest loans. In 2002, 66
percent of the business R&D funding consisted of grants. In general, the same
funding criteria apply to both grants and subsidized loans. The key element
determining the suitable funding instrument is the readiness of the output of
a project to be introduced in the market: grants are directed to more basic
research oriented R&D and R&D work done at the early phases of the innova-
tion process. Subsidized loans and capital loans are aimed at R&D work in the
later stages of the innovation process in which the focus is on developing a com-
plete product or service that can be introduced in the market. In practice the
distinction between diﬀerent phases of the innovation process is not clear-cut
and a project can incorporate both stages. As a result, Tekes funding can be a
combination of several instruments.
The decision-making process within Tekes starts with allocating an applica-
tion to a relevant technology ﬁeld.7 In general, the relevant technology ﬁeld is
the one that has the best technological and industry knowledge related to the
project proposal. The technology ﬁeld then sets up a group that takes care of
the treatment of the application. This group is responsible for the evaluation of
the project proposal, and based on its evaluation the group prepares a funding
proposal with key arguments supporting the proposal.
The decision-making process within Tekes has several stages depending on
the applied amount. At each stage the funding proposal and related arguments
are presented and discussed. For smaller applied amounts the ﬁnal decision is
made at the lower decision making levels. Project proposals consisting of larger
applied amounts are handled through several stages and lower decision making
levels decide on whether the funding proposal can be forwarded to the next
stage.
Although the oﬃcial decision-maker is an individual except in the case of the
board, the decision-making process is in practice highly collective. To start with,
it is not a single person that is responsible for the evaluation of the projects,
but a project group consisting of several employees. In addition, usually several
7The description of the decision-making process is based on internal material of Tekes and
discussions with Tekes employees to which the author had access during an 11-month stay at
Tekes in 2002. The description reﬂects the decision making process during the sample period
in question.
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project proposals are dealt with at each decision-making meeting and the dis-
cussion concerning a project proposal is open to all participating Tekes oﬃcials
- not only the project group and the decision-maker. This collective character of
the decision-making process reduces the possibilities to make funding decisions
based on an individual's own self-interests, given that the self-interests are not
in line with the goals of the organization. What remains, though, is the possible
ambiguity at the organizational level.
3.2 Funding principles of the R&D subsidy program
According to Tekes its funding is targeted at projects which produce new knowl-
edge, bear high technological and commercial risks and in which the impact of
Tekes' funding is substantial [32]. More speciﬁcally the funding of Tekes is
considered to
• increase customers R&D and controlled risk-taking
• enable the creation and utilization of new knowledge and technology
• impact the level of challenge, quality, networking and implementation of
R&D projects
• share technological, commercial and ﬁnancial risks related to R&D projects
[32].
These extracts highlight that sharing the risk involved in a project and pro-
moting innovative, risk-intensive projects are central elements of Tekes funding.8
In making the actual funding decision Tekes pursues its objectives through
the following main evaluation criteria:
a) the business activity to be pursued - The goal is to promote projects that
generate proﬁtable business opportunities for global markets.
b) the technology, innovation or competence to be developed - The technology,
innovation or competence to be developed should be technologically new
8In economic terms a mean-preserving spread could be used to characterize the concept of
risk-taking in this setup. Assume that a ﬁrm has two projects that generate the same expected
return. However, the dispersion of the possible outcomes diﬀer between these two projects.
The probability of the more risky project to generate a return considerably higher than the
expected one is larger than that of the less risky project. Conversely, the probability of
generating outcomes with signiﬁcantly smaller returns compared to the expected one is higher
for the more risky project. A risk-averse ﬁrm chooses the less risky project, whereas the
public agency would want the ﬁrm to choose the more risky one that has a higher probability
of generating "a global success story".
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and challenging at least to the company itself. In addition, knowledge
and know-how created within the project should generate long lasting
competitive advantage to the company. Also internationally high-level
challenges are appreciated.
c) the resources available for the project - To be realistic the project proposal
should incorporate adequate human and economic resources and the com-
pany should have a sound ﬁnancial standing.
d) co-operation within the project - One central aim of Tekes funding is to
promote both domestic and international networking with other compa-
nies, universities and research centers.
e) the eﬀect of Tekes funding on the project - The aim is that with Tekes fund-
ing the companies are willing to carry out more challenging R&D projects
than they otherwise would and that by providing resources for eﬃcient
networking the funding enhances the widespread use of the beneﬁts of the
project in the Finnish economy.
f) societal beneﬁts of the project - Societal beneﬁts that favor Tekes funding
are: positive environmental eﬀects, balanced regional development, ame-
lioration of the Finnish working and living conditions, improvements to
back up the development of social welfare and health-care, promotion of
the national energy strategy and promotion of equality.
Besides these general funding principles Tekes puts special emphasis on sup-
porting SMEs by imposing more stringent requirements on large ﬁrms. Large
ﬁrms' projects should fulﬁll at least one of the following criteria: networking
with SMEs, universities or research institutes, participation in a technology pro-
gram, participation in an international R&D project and network, the project
consisting mainly of industrial research, or research outcomes are public. Also
the upper bound for the subsidy-rate is lower for ﬁrms not fulﬁlling the oﬃcial
SME criteria.
Almost half of the Tekes funding was steered through technology programs.
Companies, research institutes and Tekes plan the technology programs in co-
operation. Together they identify speciﬁc sectors of technology or industry that
are perceived to need focused national support to boost the development of the
sector and the diﬀusion of knowledge. Technology programs aim at creating
forums for the exchange of information and networking between companies and
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research groups in strategically important R&D areas. The same evaluation
criteria apply to projects funded through technology programs.
4 Data
Originally the data contain all the business sector applications for R&D sub-
sidies Tekes received from January 1st 2000 to June 30th 2002 and consist of
detailed information on the project proposal, the applicant ﬁrm and the funding
decision of Tekes. This original data covers 3347 applications from 2098 ﬁrms.
However, Tekes started the extensive collection of project level data in 2001.
After cleaning the data of missing values we are left with 1217 projects that
constitute the sample analyzed in this paper. 1080 of the applications within
the sample, almost 90 percent, are from the years 2001 or 2002 and in total 55
percent of the applications received in 2001 or 2002 are covered by the sample.9
4.1 The dependent variable
As mentioned in section 3.1, Tekes funding can be a combination of several
instruments. Tekes grants subsidies, subsidized loans and subsidized capital
loans. The granted funding can be a pure subsidy, a pure loan, a pure capital
loan or a subsidy combined with either a loan or a capital loan. Subsidized
loans not only have an interest rate below the market rate but they are also
soft: If the project turns out to be a commercial failure, the loan may not
have to be paid back. A subsidized capital loan granted by Tekes diﬀers from
the standard private sector debt contract in various ways: it is included in ﬁxed
assets in the balance sheet, it can be paid oﬀ only when unrestricted shareholders
equity is positive, and the debtor does not have to give collateral for the loan.
Table 1 below shows the share of each instrument of the total funding applied
and allocated to business R&D for the original data and the sample used in this
paper. The ﬁgures indicate that subsidies cover over 80 % of the applied amount
while the corresponding ﬁgure for granted funding is around 65 %. Some 28 %
of applications are rejected.
Tekes grants subsidies ex-ante as a share of to-be-incurred R&D costs. In the
application the applicant reports the anticipated costs of the projects. Some-
9In order to analyze whether there appears to be some systematic diﬀerences between all
the applications and applications covered by the sample used, I did some basic comparisons of
frequencies across industries, size classes, funding decisions, granted amounts, etc. No major
diﬀerences were found.
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Table 1: The share of each instrument of the total funding applied and allocated.
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times Tekes adjusts this proposed budget, both down and up, when an applicant,
e.g., applies for subsidies for costs that Tekes cannot cover. In practice an up-
ward adjustment is rare and in principle occurs only if a project signiﬁcantly
changes character during the application process. To-be-incurred R&D costs
refer to the costs accepted by Tekes and in the following are called "accepted
costs". The actual funding then covers the promised share of incurred costs up
to a speciﬁed euro limit.
The dependent variable used to describe the size of a subsidy in this paper is
the eﬀective subsidy-rate of the granted funding. Eﬀective means that instead
of taking into account the absolute value of a loan, only the "subsidized" part
of a loan is considered. This is the estimated diﬀerence between a market loan
and a corresponding Tekes loan. In order to calculate the subsidy-rate of each
decision using the exact formula, one would need information on the loan period,
redemption free years and interest rates. Unfortunately, the data available has
information only on the absolute amount granted. However, Tekes provided
illustrative subsidy-rate calculations using a loan period of six years with three
redemption free years. These calculations were used to derive the following
approximation of the eﬀective subsidy-rate.
si = (grant+ 0.2 ∗ loan+ 0.1 ∗ capital loan)/(accepted costs). (1)
This is the dependent variable used to describe the size of subsidy in the analy-
sis.10 The mean subsidy-rate of the successful applications in the sample is 0.31
(0.32 in the original data).
4.2 Explanatory variables
Explanatory variables consist of both project- and ﬁrm-level variables. Firm-
level characteristics are mainly used to control for ﬁrm speciﬁc factors that may
indirectly or directly aﬀect the subsidy decisions, namely the acceptance decision
and the subsidy-rate decision. These include characteristics like age, size and
R&D and export activities. Also the application history of the ﬁrm is included.
Given the cross-sectional approach the application history is likely to capture
at least to some extent unobserved heterogeneity across ﬁrms related to their
10To get an idea of how adding up grants and loans in the form of eﬀective subsidy-rate
may aﬀect the result, I also estimated the model using only grants. Qualitatively the results
remain the same, but in general, the estimated coeﬃcients tend to be slightly smaller when
only grants are taken into account. However, the results are so close to each other that
dropping loans from the analysis is not considered warranted.
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Table 2: Description of the explanatory variables.
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innovative activities. The main interest is in analyzing project-level diﬀerences
between projects initiated by SMEs and large ﬁrms.11 Do the acceptance and
subsidy-rate decisions of Tekes indicate diﬀerent underlying patterns for SMEs
and large ﬁrms? Are there diﬀerences between SMEs and large ﬁrms in how
project characteristics are related to subsidy decisions?
Table 2 contains descriptions of the explanatory variables. CHALLENGE
and diﬀerent project-level RISK -variables are evaluations of the technical ad-
visers of Tekes, and according to Tekes they are the key evaluation criteria in
the decision-making. CHALLENGE describes the technological challenge of the
project and it can have values from 0 to 5 with 0 meaning "no technological
challenge", 2 "novelty value only to the applicant", 3 "novelty value to the re-
gion or network", 4 "demanding national level", 5 "demanding international
level" and 6 "international top-class". RISK -measures describe how risky the
project is in terms of the economic stance of the applicant, human resources,
technological content and market potential. All the RISK -indicators are mea-
sured on a six-level Likert scale (no risk, small risk, considerable risk, big risk,
very big risk, unbearable risk). Given the qualitative nature of these indicators
the absolute values are diﬃcult to interpret. It is not clear what small, con-
siderable or big risk means. In addition, they are based on the judgment of
technical advisors and diﬀerent advisors may evaluate these qualitative aspects
diﬀerently. However, the collective nature of Tekes' decision making is likely to
reduce this latter problem. As such, the indicators should be valid for relative
comparisons.
Of the RISK -measures the main interest is in technological and commercial
risk. Risks related to the economic stance of the applicant and human resources
reserved for the project are used to control for the ability of the applicant to
carry out the project in the ﬁrst place. If the applicant is facing serious economic
problems or clearly lacks adequate competences no project is likely to succeed.
The number of ﬁrm and research partners measure the degree of collabora-
tion within a project. NOVELTY -measures describe whether the technology,
application and/or business to be developed are new to the applicant ﬁrm.
They are indicative of how radical the project is from the point of view of the
applicant ﬁrm. NO_MARKET gets a value one if market objectives of the
project are indirect. EU-SUPPORT REGION, TECHNOLOGY_PROGRAM
11In the empirical analysis an enterprise is considered to be a SME if it has less than 250
employees and its yearly turnover is less than 40 million euros or its balance sheet total is not
over 27 million euros. These follow the EU criteria for SME.
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and PROJECT_SIZE are added as project-level control variables. Projects
from ﬁrms locating in EU-support regions are entitled to a 5 to 10 percentage
points higher subsidy-rate than a comparable project from other regions.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics.
Firm-level
AGE 13,7 10 16 0 113 14,0 10 16 0 106 12,6 10 15 0 113
EMPLOYEES 542,5 22 3316 1 57482 611,0 24 3654 1 57482 324,9 16 1859 1 22804
SALES_EMPL 153,0 92 628 0 17600 168,0 95 716 0 17600 104,0 75 133 0 1495
APPL_DUM 0,6 1,00 0,48 0 1 0,7 1,00 0,47 0 1 0,6 1,00 0,50 0 1
APPLICATIONS 4,1 1 11 0 137 4,7 1 12 0 137 2,1 1 5 0 53
GRANT/APPL 0,5 0,50 0,45 0 1 0,5 0,67 0,45 0 1 0,4 0,00 0,43 0 1
SME 0,7 1 0,45 0 1 0,7 1 0,45 0 1 0,7 1 0,46 0 1
R&D 5885,0 122 97800 0 2700000 6301,0 147 108000 0 2700000 4565,0 66 55200 0 777000
R&D_DUM 0,8 1 0,40 0 1 0,8 1 0,38 0 1 0,7 1 0,46 0 1
EXPORT 59300,0 82 597000 0 1,3E+07 73500,0 119 683000 0 13400000 14300,0 6 88600 0 1100000
EXPORT_DUM 0,6 1 0,48 0 1 0,6 1 0,47 0 1 0,5 1 0,50 0 1
Project-level
CHALLENGE 3,4 4 1,01 0 5 3,7 4 0,83 0 5 2,7 3 1,09 0 5
RISK_COMPETENCE 1,5 1 0,84 0 5 1,4 1 0,78 0 4 1,5 1 0,99 0 5
RISK_ECONOMIC 1,3 1 1,10 0 5 1,2 1 0,97 0 4 1,6 1 1,35 0 5
RISK_TECHNOLOGICAL 2,1 2 0,93 0 5 2,3 2 0,87 0 4 1,8 2 0,98 0 5
RISK_MARKETS 2,3 2 0,99 0 5 2,2 2 0,95 0 4 2,3 2 1,08 0 5
NOVELTY_TECH 0,4 0 0,48 0 1 0,4 0 0,49 0 1 0,3 0 0,46 0 1
NOVELTY_APPL 0,3 0 0,47 0 1 0,3 0 0,47 0 1 0,3 0 0,46 0 1
NOVELTY_BUSINESS 0,1 0 0,25 0 1 0,1 0 0,22 0 1 0,1 0 0,32 0 1
NO MARKET 0,1 0 0,23 0 1 0,1 0 0,22 0 1 0,1 0 0,25 0 1
RESEARCH_PARTNERS 2,5 2 1,87 0 9 2,6 2 1,94 0 9 2,3 2 1,65 0 8
FIRM_PARTNERS 1,3 1 1,26 0 8 1,5 1 1,28 0 8 1,0 1 1,14 0 8
PROJECT_SIZE 921,0 389 1867 11 27000 1015,0 434 2078 14 27000 670,0 293 110 11 11200
TECH_PROGRAM 0,5 0 0,50 0 1 0,5 0 0,50 0 1 0,4 0 0,49 0 1
EU-SUPPORT REGION 0,2 0 0,43 0 1 0,2 0 0,43 0 1 0,2 0 0,42 0 1
Rejected applications (334)
Max Mean
All applications (1218) Successful applications ( 884 )
Min MaxStd. Dev. Std. Dev. Min MaxMean Median
All applicants (827 firms) At least one successful application ( 629 firms) Rejected applicants (198 firms)
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Median
From Table 3 we see that compared to applicants with rejected applications
ﬁrms that have successful applications are on average larger in terms of num-
ber of employees, have higher sales per employee, more exports and more R&D
investment, and have higher success rate in their earlier applications. When
looking at the project characteristics we can notice that successful project pro-
posals are technologically more challenging and have higher technological risk
whereas risk related especially to the economic stance of the applicant ﬁrm is on
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average lower. In addition, successful project proposals incorporate on average
more research and ﬁrm partners, and the overall size of the project proposal,
measured as costs proposed by the applicant, is on average larger for successful
applications compared to rejected ones.
4.3 Mapping the data to rationales
Section 2.1 ended with the following arguments.
• SMEs are likelier to face ﬁnancing constraints.
• Subsidizing risk-taking is more justiﬁable in the case of SMEs.
• Subsidizing large ﬁrms rests to a large extent on the knowledge spillover
justiﬁcation.
Taking these arguments to the Tekes funding is not straightforward, but
some simple ex-ante conjectures of the estimated coeﬃcients can be made. Let
us ﬁrst consider ﬁnancing constraints and risk-taking that are at least partly
overlapping. A ﬁrm may undertake too little risk in its innovative activity ei-
ther because it is unwilling or because it faces ﬁnancing constraints for riskier
projects. Both justiﬁcations arise from the uncertainty inherent in innovative ac-
tivities. Higher degree of risk is likely to aggravate information asymmetries be-
tween the innovator and external ﬁnancier increasing the likelihood of ﬁnancing
constraints. As such problems related to risk-taking and the possibility of fac-
ing ﬁnancing constraints are considered to increase with the degree of risk. The
two variables that directly attempt to measure the degree of technological and
commercial risk of a project are RISK_TECHNOLOGY and RISK_MARKET
respectively. In addition, the degree of risk could be expected to increase
with challenge and novelty of the project. Therefore RISK_TECHNOLOGY,
RISK_MARKET, CHALLENGE, NOVELTY_TECH, andNOVELTY_BUSINESS
are expected to be positively related to subsidy decisions concerning SMEs.
As discussed by Feldman and Kelley [8] connections to other organiza-
tions, namely other ﬁrms and universities, are indicative of expected knowledge
spillovers from a project. The more collaborating partners there are the greater
the potential for knowledge spillovers. More basic research oriented projects
are also considered to yield greater potential for knowledge spillovers (see [8]).
The data does not contain direct information whether a project is more or less
basic research oriented, but given the funding principles of Tekes having indirect
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market objectives is likely to reﬂect a more basic research oriented project. In
addition, the degree of technological risk, challenge and technological novelty
may be linked to knowledge spillovers. It could be considered that techno-
logically more challenging, riskier or radical projects embrace the potential for
broader knowledge spillovers. RESEARCH_PARTNERS, FIRM_PARTNERS,
NO_MARKET, RISK_TECHNOLOGY, CHALLENGE, andNOVELTY_TECH
are expected to be positively related to subsidy decisions concerning large ﬁrms.
5 The econometric setup
The starting point for the econometric analysis is a subsidy-rule derived by
Takalo, Tanayama and Toivanen [31] (TTT). TTT build a structural model of
the R&D subsidy process that explicitly models the application and investment
decisions of ﬁrms and the subsidy-rate decision of the agency. In the model the
agency allocating subsidies chooses the subsidy-rate si to maximize its expected
beneﬁts from project i. The speciﬁc form of the government agency's utility
function is presented in TTT. Using some functional form assumptions TTT
show that the optimization problem of the government bureaucrats yields the
following unconstrained decision-rule (see TTT for details):
s∗i = 1− g + Ziδ′ + ηi. (2)
g is the constant opportunity cost of the agency's resources. Zi is a vector of
observable applicant and project characteristics that aﬀect the expected beneﬁts
from the project to the government. δ in turn is the parameter vector reﬂecting
the eﬀect of Zi on the subsidy-rate. The subsidy-rate is a share of the R&D
investment, and it is subject to minimum and maximum constraints. In the case
of Tekes the upper bound for the subsidy share diﬀers between SMEs and larger
ﬁrms. If a ﬁrm fulﬁlls the EU SME criterion (see footnote 2) , the upper bound
is 0.6, otherwise 0.5. The lower bound is zero (rejected applications). ηi is the
unobserved (by the econometrician) error term. In this study the error term is
assumed to follow a normal distribution and to be uncorrelated with applicant
characteristics. TTT test the robustness of this distributional assumption in
their work by applying a non-parametric CLAD estimator proposed by Powell
[26]. The results are very similar to those obtained with the distributional
assumption.
This paper concerns equation (2). The estimable equation builds directly on
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equation (2) with some modiﬁcations. First, the minimum constraint of 0 and
the maximum constraint of s are taken into account and the opportunity cost g
is embedded in the overall constant of the estimated equation and thus cannot
be identiﬁed. These modiﬁcations yield the following constrained subsidy-rule:
si =

0 if s∗ ≤ 0
Ziδ + ηi if 0 < s
∗ < s¯
s¯ if s∗ ≥ s¯
(3)
As can be noted, equation (3) is censored both below zero and above s¯.
There is a positive probability mass at zero and at s¯ whereas in between, si
is continuous. An equation like (3) is estimated as a two-limit Tobit model.
The two-limit Tobit model, however, assumes that the same process determines
both zero and positive subsidies. It may be that actually the subsidy decision
consists of two stages: ﬁrst an application is either accepted or rejected, and
second, for accepted applications the actual subsidy-rate is decided. In order to
allow for the possibility that the characteristics Z are diﬀerently related to the
acceptance decision and to the subsidy-rate decision the TTT setup is modiﬁed
as follows.
si =
{
di(Ziδ + ηi) if s
∗ < s¯
s¯ if s∗ ≥ s¯ (4)
di is a binary variable that gets a value 1 if si > 0 and a value 0 if si = 0. di is
assumed to follow a probit model, that is,
P (di = 1|Zi) = Φ(Ziβ) (5)
In the ﬁrst stage a binary probability model is used to describe the accep-
tance decision and in the second stage a truncated from zero censored above s¯
linear regression model is used to describe the size of granted subsidy-rate.
Z consists of explanatory variables presented in Table 2. To analyze dif-
ferences in the allocation of subsidies to SMEs and large ﬁrms Z also includes
interactions of all the variables in Table 2 with a dummy indicating a large ﬁrm
(LARGE ). To control for industry and time variation both industry and time
dummies are added to estimation.
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6 Estimation results
To test for the possibility that the subsidy decision is actually made in two
steps both a two-limit and a two-part model were estimated. A likelihood ratio
test clearly rejected the two-limit model in favor of the two-part model with
likelihood ratio statistic getting a value of 490. The result indicates that ﬁrm-
and project-level characteristics have a disproportionate eﬀect on the probability
of an application to be accepted and on the granted subsidy-rate. This suggests
that the subsidy-decision can be considered as a two-stage decision problem.
First stage consists of the acceptance decision and in the second stage the level
of the subsidy-rate is decided. Therefore, the two-part model was chosen.12
Due to non-linear models and interaction eﬀects the estimated parameters
are diﬃcult to interpret. Therefore marginal eﬀects are computed for each
observation and the ﬁgure reported is the mean over all observations. Standard
errors are bootstrap estimates with 500 replications.
6.1 Acceptance decision
Table 4 presents the estimation results for the acceptance decision. The marginal
eﬀects for SMEs reveal that challenge and technological risk have the anticipated
sign. More challenging projects and projects with higher degree of technological
risk are likelier to receive Tekes funding. Interestingly neither commercial risk
nor technological or business novelty are signiﬁcantly related to the acceptance
decision. Unlike the conjecture, all of them get a negative although insigniﬁcant
marginal eﬀect. Risks related to the resources reserved for the project and
economic stance of the applicant ﬁrm are negatively associated and thus reduce
the probability of an application to be accepted as could be expected. Having
indirect market objectives reduces the acceptance probability by 36%, however
only 3.5% (26) of the projects initiated by SMEs have indirect market objectives
compared to 9% in the case of large ﬁrms. The number of both ﬁrm and research
partners gets a positive sign.
For large ﬁrms the results are more in line with the conjectures. Technolog-
ical challenge, technological risk, technological novelty, indirect market objec-
12In order to use a two-part model a conditional independence assumption is needed. That
is, it is assumed that conditional on Z the mechanism determining acceptance decision and
the subsidy-rate decision are independent. I tested for this assumption by using a Heckman
selection model with logit transformation imposed on the subsidy-rate and excluding vari-
ables RISK_COMPETENCE and TECH_PROGRAM from the subsidy-rate equation. The
conditional independence assumption could not be rejected.
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Table 4: Estimation results of the acceptance decision.
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tives and the number of ﬁrm partners all increase the acceptance probability.
The number of research partners gets a positive but statistically insigniﬁcant
marginal eﬀect. Unexpectedly, commercial risk is positively related to the accep-
tance decision of projects initiated by large ﬁrms. Risks related to the economic
stance of the applicant ﬁrm and to the human resources reserved for the projects
do not seem to be related to the acceptance decision in the case of large ﬁrms.
Looking at the underlying distributions of these risk measures reveals that this
is rather due to diﬀerent overall characteristics of these two group of ﬁrms than
Tekes valuing these risks diﬀerently (see Figure 1 in the Appendix).
Comparing the statistically signiﬁcant marginal eﬀects between projects ini-
tiated by SMEs and large ﬁrms indicates that for both groups the impact of
technological challenge on the probability of an application to be accepted is
equally pronounced. Likewise the magnitude of the marginal eﬀect of tech-
nological risk is about the same in both groups. Collaboration in turn seems
to matter more for the acceptance of projects initiated by SMEs. At least in
the case of ﬁrm partners this result is unlikely to arise from diﬀerent underly-
ing collaboration patterns between SMEs and large ﬁrms (see Figure 1 in the
Appendix).
6.2 Subsidy-rate decision
Table 5 presents the estimation results for the subsidy-rate conditional on ac-
ceptance. As with the acceptance decision, technological challenge and techno-
logical risk are positively related to the subsidy-rate. In addition, technological
novelty seems to increase the subsidy-rate. These results are all as expected.
What is unexpected though is the negative relationship between the subsidy-rate
and commercial risk. Collaboration seems to matter also for the subsidy-rate in
the case of SMEs. Somewhat confusingly, indirect market objectives now has a
large positive marginal eﬀect. Having indirect market objectives increases the
subsidy-rate by 10%. As mentioned above, the interpretability of this estimate
may be reduced by the fact that only 14 accepted projects intiated by SMEs
have indirect market objectives.
For large ﬁrms technological challenge, technological risk and technological
novelty continue have a parallel role in the subsidy-rate decision as expected.
subsidy-rate increases with all of them. Apart from the project-level control
variable describing the size of the project no other project level characteristic
gets a statistically signiﬁcant marginal eﬀect. Unlike expectations neither col-
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Table 5: Estimation results of the subsidy-rate decision.
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laboration nor indirect market objectives seem to be related to the subsidy-rate
granted to large ﬁrms.
In line with the acceptance decision, the marginal eﬀects of challenge and
technological risk are more or less of equal size for both SMEs and large ﬁrms.
However, the impact of challenge is now in general less pronounced. In addi-
tion, the technological novelty is almost equally related to the subsidy intensity
granted to SMEs and large ﬁrms. If anything, challenge is weighted more in the
case of large ﬁrms while technological risk and novelty in the case of SMEs.
6.3 Summary of estimation results
Pulling together the estimation results of both the acceptance and subsidy-rate
decisions, several conclusions can be made. First, for both SMEs and large
ﬁrms Tekes seems to emphasize the technological content of the project when
deciding on the subsidy. In addition, there are no major diﬀerences in how
the characteristics related to the technological content of a project weigh in the
subsidy decisions concerning SMEs or large ﬁrms. The only notable diﬀerence is
that the technological novelty does not seem to be a determinant of acceptance
for SMEs while it is related to the subsidy-rate.
Unlike expectations, the commercial risk related to a project is positively
related to the acceptance decision concerning large ﬁrms while negatively re-
lated to the subsidy-rate of SMEs. Both results contradict expectations. Based
on economic rationales it is hard to justify why government should subsidize
commercial risks of large ﬁrms. Large ﬁrms are unlikely to suﬀer from ﬁnancing
constraints and in general are in a better position to carry risk compared to
SMEs. Commercial risk is neither considered to be related with the potential of
a project to generate knowledge spillovers. If anything, subsidizing commercial
risk might be justiﬁed in the case of SMEs that may face ﬁnancing constraints
and are possibly less prone to risk-taking.
Also the relationship of collaboration with subsidy decisions turns out to
divert from the expectation. For SMEs both ﬁrm and research partners seem
to matter for both the acceptance and the subsidy-rate decisions. In the case of
large ﬁrms the only statistically signiﬁcant relationship was the positive impact
of ﬁrm partners on the acceptance decision. One might expect that since subsi-
dizing innovative activities of large ﬁrms relies to a great extent on the spillover
argument, collaboration should matter distinctively in the case of large ﬁrms.
These results may indicate that Tekes puts more emphasis on subsidizing incom-
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ing knowledge spillovers than outgoing knowledge spillovers. This interpretation
ﬁnds further support in the result that research partners weigh somewhat more
than ﬁrm partners in the subsidy decisions concerning SMEs.
7 Conclusions
This paper examines the allocation of business R&D subsidies by analyzing the
determinants of acceptance into an R&D subsidy program. More speciﬁcally the
question addressed is whether there are diﬀerences in how subsidies are allocated
to small and medium size ﬁrms (SMEs) and large ﬁrms. The subsidy decision is
considered as a two-stage decision problem. The agency ﬁrst decisides whether
to accept an application and then the subsidy-rate. The program under scrutiny
is that of the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation (Tekes)
for which I have unique data on everyone who applied over a two and a half
year period including data on internal project evaluations of Tekes.
The results indicate that the technological content of a project proposal is
an important determinant of the subsidy decisions. Technological challenge and
- risk are positively associated with both the acceptance probability and the
subsidy-rate. This holds for both SMEs and large ﬁrms and to similar extent.
Technological novelty increases also the subsidy-rate for all, but is positively
related to the acceptance only for large ﬁrms. If one is willing to accept that on
average technological challenge, risk and novelty of a project reﬂect uncertainty
and the potential for knowledge spillovers these result may ﬁnd some basis in
economic rationales justifying R&D subsidies.
Unlike expectations, commercial risk is, if anything, negatively related to
the subsidy decisions concerning projected initiated by SMEs. However, in
the case of large ﬁrms, higher commercial risk increases the probability of an
application to be accepted. Based on the economic rationales it is not easy
to justify these results. First, possible ﬁnancing constraints and reluctance
towards risk-taking are rooted in the commercial and technological risk of a
project. If some group of ﬁrms is likely to suﬀer from these market failures
it is especially the SMEs. Second, it is not easy to ﬁnd arguments that would
support subsidizing commercial risks of large ﬁrms. Large ﬁrms are not likely to
suﬀer from ﬁnancing constraints and they are better equipped to cope with risk-
taking. Nor are there clear reasons to believe that commercial risk is positively
related to knowledge spillovers.
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Given that Tekes is a government agency redistributing taxpayers' money,
the risk-averse attitude towards commercial risk especially in the case of SMEs
is probably understandable. Realized high market risk is likely to have more
serious consequences for a SME than for a large ﬁrm. In addition, it may be
that the public opinion is more tolerant of technological failure of a project
than of a commercial one. However, neither the Tekes funding principles nor
the rationales are in line with this behavior. Maybe this is an example where a
perceived market failure is at least partly replaced by government failure.
Collaboration clearly weights in the decision making of Tekes. However,
collaboration seems to matter especially for projects initiated by SMEs. Given
that subsidizing innovative activities of large ﬁrms rests to a large extent on the
knowledge spillover argument this is unexpected. This may be an indication of
Tekes promoting incoming rather than outgoing spillovers. Subsidizing outgoing
spillovers is about providing incentives to share knowledge, subsidizing incoming
spillovers is rather about encouraging knowledge absorption.
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Appendix 1
Figure 1: Distribution of economic risk, risk related to resources, research part-
ners and ﬁrm partners among SMEs and large ﬁrms.
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